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1. Introduction 
Aiming to recentralize fiscal capacity and address the abuse of preferential tax policy 
by local government in 1980s, the Chinese tax-reform 1994 seems to have achieved 
such ends. The decline of revenue-to-GDP ratio and central government’s share of 
total revenue has been reversed under the new Tax-Sharing-System (TSS). The tax 
structure has been simplified by a uniform VAT tax and the central tax authority has 
been re-strengthened by establishing its own tax administrative agency, the 
national-tax-bureau-system, under the State Taxation Administration (SAT) paralleling 
the local-tax-bureau-system controlled by local governments. Yet, assessing such 
outcomes is not straightforward from a comprehensive perspective over Chinese 
public finance (Zhang, 1999; Lee, 2000; Wong, 2000). Firstly, the recentralization of 
fiscal capacity was far from success. If intergovernmental transfers are excluded, the 
net share of central government’s revenues accounted for much less than those 
ostensibly increasing figures in the statistical report. Secondly, considering 
substantive extrabudgetary and off-budget revenues, which particularly exist in 
Chinese local budget system, local governments remain extensive discretionary power 
over such fiscal resources. Thirdly, local governments are willing to and able to 
implement various countermeasures to circumvent the central policies in favor of their 
own interests. Therefore, the status quo of de facto fiscal decentralization was not 
changed so much and local government still use a variety of preferential tax policies 
but in a special way to attract investments, as showed by recent field research in local 
China (Krug, et al., 2005).  
 
Consequently, the de facto fiscal decentralization induces inter-jurisdictional tax 
competition, thereby opening a window of opportunity for firms, especially those with 
substantial influences, to negotiate with local governments for preferential tax 
treatments albeit more difficult facing unified and standardized central tax policy. 
With regard to the bulk of incentives for investment strategy, preferential tax 
treatments obviously stand out of others and induce firm’s Tieboutian migration (1956) 
for less tax burden. However, asset specificity (Williamson, 1985) like site specificity, 
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physical and human asset specificity and dedicated assets might generate lock-in 
effect and make exit less attractive to firm. Thus, in addition to such “voting by feet”, 
an alternative is to voice, as Hirschman (1970) puts in his influential book Exit, Voice 
and Loyalty. Unlike its common counterpart in western countries as complaint or 
lobbying, voice is delivered via a guanxi network in China, especially via the 
entrepreneur’s personal relations with government officials who are in charge of 
policy-making or -implementation. Embedded in a complex, uncertain and 
unpredictable business environment in China, such political affiliation is crucial to 
business success. It emphasizes the reciprocity and long-term relationship so as to 
need exchanged interests and substantive inputs in means of money, time and effort to 
cultivate, maintain and expand (Yang, 1994; 2002; Boisot and Child, 1996; Luo, 
1997). Therefore, since both exit and voice accrue cost and risk as well, a rational 
entrepreneur makes choice on the ground of cost-benefit-calculation and the response 
of government. However, to what extent will the exit option surpasses voice option 
and vice versa? Under what conditions will they be residual or alternative of each 
other? Would they be jointly adopted as a mixed strategy? What institutions would 
facilitate exit vis-à-vis voice? 
 
In order to answer preceding questions and operate and extend Exit-Voice theory, we 
construct a game model of interaction between firm and local government, in terms of 
exit and voice for preferential tax treatments, and reveals dynamics of these two 
options under rational entrepreneurship of economizing transaction cost. The 
remainder will proceed as follows. Next section conceptualizes exit and voice 
compared to Hirschman’s original account. Section 3 and 4 present the basic and 
extended model of exit-voice game between firm and local government and the 
equilibria outcomes, followed by the section of empirical cases. The final section 
draws the conclusion. 
 
2. Exit and voice theory 
2.1 Tiebout model and voice 
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Tiebout’s seminal article (1956) suggests that individuals, by moving their residences, 
select preferred combination of public goods provided by local community and 
tolerance of tax payment as buying private goods in a competitive market. The 
original model regards individual’s tax payment as price for public package and local 
government as a producer. After marginal-cost-and-benefit-calculation, individual 
migrates into target region, thereby forcing local government to economize cost (tax 
levy) and provide desired public goods. Finally, both demand for and supply of public 
goods reach a Pareto optimum in different localities. Individual preference is, in 
particular, fully revealed through such mimic market exchange mechanism so as to 
address Samuelsonian (1954) distortion of public policy due to the lack of private 
information. Similarly, firms could move their locations to maximize profit and 
minimize tax cost as well (Richter, 1994; Richter and Wellisch, 1996). They could 
also shift their income into tax haven by internal transfer pricing system among 
different subsidiaries (Osmundsen, et al., 1998; Mintz and Smart, 2004). Such “voting 
by feet” based on the mobility induces various inter-jurisdictional tax competitions for 
inflow investments or factors (Wilson, 1999). Local governments leapfrog to reduce 
local tax rate and alleviate tax burden (Musgrave, 1997) or even engage in a 
“destructive interregional competition” (Cumberlans, 1981) for mobile firms, termed 
as “bidding for firms” (Black and Hoyt, 1989) or “race to the bottom” (Grandy, 1989). 
 
Yet, this is only part of the story. Exit for preferential tax treatments in real world may 
undertake considerable costs and risks, not so easily as switch from an apple to an 
orange in the supermarket. Asset specificity (Williamson, 1985) weakens investment 
redeployabilty and locks firms in a certain location. So do entrepreneurs and 
employees who have lived in a location for years. They own site-specific assets, 
embrace specific local culture and language, enjoy environmental amenities, possess 
residence-specific human capital and involve in personal network that significantly 
deliquesces any exit intention (Blankart, 2002). Hence, exit is vulnerable to be 
blocked or inhibited thanks to prohibitive exit cost. Tiebout model has not only 
received extensive theoretical critiques (Bewley, 1981) but also experienced empirical 
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challenges (for review see Dowding, et al., 1994). From this point of view, 
Hirschman’s exit-voice framework (1970) is particularly applicable to extend Tiebout 
model1 and makes “voting by hand” an attractive alternative to “voting by feet”. 
 
Taking an example of buying product in a competitive market, Hirschman (1970) 
claims that if the quality is deteriorating or price is rising consumers could punish the 
producer by shifting to its rivals and let market to select the fittest survival. 
Alternatively, consumers could voice to the firm for performance recuperation. 
According to Hirschman’s definition (1970, p.30), voice is “any attempt at all to 
change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, whether through 
individual or collective petition to the management directly in charge, through appeal 
to a higher authority with the intention of forcing a change in management, or through 
various types of actions and protests, including those that are meant to mobilize public 
opinion.”  
 
Orbell and Uno’s (1972) study on the exit-voice propensity of urban people dealing 
with a neighborhood problem has shown that people, as a rational decision maker, 
choose whether exit or voice by weighing marginal benefit and cost. The high moving 
cost to the suburbs, such as housing, commute and taxes, would lead people to voice 
their discontent and struggle for improvement of neighborhood conditions. 
Furthermore, if the public goods and service within the community carry such 
characteristics as: i) economies of scale; ii) difficulty of specifying expected quality of 
service; iii) nature of monopoly; iv) “connoisseur goods” with exit barriers (education, 
health care, etc.); v) consumers incompetent to exercise exit (children or the ill, etc.), 
the exit is likely to be inefficient for inhabitants (Young, 1974). So far voice option 
functions as a substitute when the exit option is less attractive. 
 
However, exit and voice may be complementary to each other. Sharp (1984) finds that 
                                                        
1 See Dowding, et al. (2000) for a detailed review. 
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better educated and higher income people who have indeed greater mobility appear 
more inclination to opt voice in local affairs and their voice receive more attention 
from local officials in that their potential exit could influence local economic 
well-being (Peterson, 1981). Thus, those who possess exit option but regard it as the 
last resort would be more likely prefer voice and directly articulate their concerns 
since local government would more seriously take care of their voice due to the threat 
of exit.  
 
The dynamics of these two options might result in contradict outcomes: the presence 
of the exit tends to “atrophy the development of the art of voice (Hirschman, 1970, 
p.43)” on the one hand; and on the other hand, “in some situations, exit will therefore 
be a reaction of last resort after voice has failed (p.37, italic in original).”  
 
2.2 Exit-voice in local China 
Despite China’s authoritarian political regime, a de facto fiscal decentralization has 
been resulted by successive fiscal reforms with significant devolution of 
policymaking authority and corresponding responsibility from the central state 
apparatus to local government since 1970s (Wong, 1991; 1992; 1997). Particularly, a 
market-preserving federalism of Chinese style, which restricts central government’s 
excessive intervention and aligns appropriate incentives for local government with 
local economic prosperity, has been shaped (Montinola, et al., 1995; Weingast, 1995; 
Qian and Weingast, 1996; 1997; Qian and Roland, 1998).  
 
Under such institutional arrangement, exit available to individuals and firms imposes 
powerful constraint on central and local government size and forces public policy to 
gear with consumer-citizens’ preference which has been empirically tested by Zhu and 
Krug (2005). Firms are able to migrate or establish new subsidiary to seek most 
preferential treatments and best investment environment. For instance, firms may 
enjoy a corporate income tax exemption in the first two years after making profit and 
50 per cent reduction in the third through fifth year. Moreover, since 1980s, various 
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Special Zones at national, provincial or even sub-provincial level have been set up, 
which proffer further favored polices such as tax rate discount, tax holiday, 
investment amortization, tax deduct, and the like2. In addition to firm’s mobility 
inducing foregoing preferential tax policies, voice is also feasible to influence 
government policy-making. In 2005, China initiated a new round tax reform to unify 
corporate income tax on domestic and foreign enterprise by abolishing some 
preferential tax treatments to the latter. In order to block such scheme, fifty-four 
multinationals jointly petitioned central government for preserving their taxation 
privileges with five to ten years’ extension3.  
 
Despite the absence of democracy institution, voice might take a variety of types in 
China as Hirschman (1970, p.30) points out “voice is nothing but a basic portion and 
function of any political system”. Here, the guanxi network is a crucial means for 
voice. It “involves the exchange of gifts, favors and banquets; the cultivation of 
personal relationships and networks of mutual dependence; and the manufacturing of 
obligation and indebtedness (Yang, 1994, p.6).” Guanxi network has existed for 
centuries and become a source of sustained competitive advantage for doing business 
in China (Tsang, 1998). Particularly, to establish the political affiliation with 
government officials who are in charge of policy-making or -implementation is 
crucial to business success in a complex, uncertain and unpredictable business 
environment (Yang, 1994; 2002; Boisot and Child, 1996; Luo, 1997). Reciprocity and 
long-term relationship are two fundamental characteristics of a sustained guanxi 
network that needs necessary exchanged interests and substantive inputs of time, 
money and effort to cultivate, maintain and expand. Considering guanxi network as 
business capital or asset, its value depends on: i) durability of a long-term relation; ii) 
wielded discretionary power; iii) connectivity to expand the network and iv) degree of 
tightness (Wank, 1996). As a result, guanxi practices of the firm with local 
                                                        
2 See Appendix 1 for various special zones at national level. 
3 A joint memorial, On New Corporate Income Tax Law: Standpoints of Multinationals Investing in China, was 
submitted to the State Council, Ministry of Finance, State Administration of Taxation, and Ministry of Commerce 
by 54 multinationals (name list in Appendix 2).  
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government could be donation to public projects, increasing local employment and 
support to various local policies in a formal way; and in an informal way, such as 
personal gifts, banquets, favors, even bribe and the like.  
 
3. Exit-voice game: the basic model 
3.1 Structure of the game  
We model a two-player, three-stage game with complete and perfect information. In 
one region, a firm makes profits-before-tax R and a local government levies tax rate r 
while a lower tax rate rL (rL<r) is offered in its neighbor region4. CC is the tax 
collection cost of local government and obviously smaller than tax revenue 
(0<CC<rLR<rR). Basically, the firm can either exit to the neighbor region for less tax 
burden, or voice to local government for equivalent preferential tax treatment but both 
actions bear cost, CE for exit and CV for voice (CE>0, CV>0). The local government 
holds two actions: reduce the tax rate to rL or maintain present tax rate r. The order of 
moves is as follows:  
 
In stage 1, the firm has three feasible actions: exit, voice or acquiesce. Exit (E) 
means firm migrates to neighbor region and ends the game with payoff (1-rL)R-CE 
to the firm and 0 to local government. Choosing acquiescence (A), the firm stays in 
the region and acquiesce the present tax rate. Consequently, it gains (1-r)R and 
leaves payoff rR-CC to local government. The voice (V) of the firm brings the game 
into stage 2; 
 
In stage 2, if local government decides to reduce tax rate r to rL, the game is 
terminated with payoff (1-rL)R-CV to firm and rLR+αCV-CC to local government. 
Here, CV denotes the voice cost that firm invests in the guanxi network with local 
officials for their “voice”, and α (0<α<1) is the rent-dissipation coefficient for such 
rent-seeking activity is non-efficient to the society. The game continues if the local 
                                                        
4 Considering that various preferential tax treatments virtually result in a lower effective tax rate to firms, local 
government’s strategy is simplified to offer lower tax rate in the model.  
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government takes the action M of maintaining present tax rate r;  
 
In stage 3, either acquiescence (A) or exit (E) of the firm ends the game. 
Accordingly, the payoff of the former action is (1-r)R-CV to firm and  rR+αCV-CC 
to local government while the latter action (1-rL)R-CV-CE and αCV. 
 
Figure 1 gives the extensive-form representation of the game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Subgame perfect equilibria and propositions 
Following backwards induction to solve this game for subgame perfect equilibria, we 
begin at the third stage where the firm chooses the optimal choice and, then, figure 
out local government’s optimal strategies in the second stage and, finally, determine 
the firm’s optimal decision in the first stage.  
 
Figure 1 indicates immediately that the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of the 
firm in the third stage is to maximize the payoff between action Acquiescence, 
(1-r)R-CV and Exit, (1-rL)R-CV-CE:  
Figure 1 Extensive form of the basic model 
Firm 
Firm 
Government
VoiceAcquiesce 
MaintainReduce 
Exit 
(1-r)R 
rR-CC 
(1-rL)R-CV 
rLR+αCV-CC 
(1-r)R-CV  
rR+αCV-CC 
(1-rL)R-CV -CE 
αCV 
Exit (1-rL)R-CE 
0 
Payoff to firm 
Payoff to local government  
Acquiesce 
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if CE <(r-rL)R => (1-r)R-CV<(1-rL)R-CV-CE, then the firm will choose Exit. Similarly, 
if CE ≥(r-rL)R => (1-r)R-CV≥(1-rL)R-CV-CE, then firm will prefer Acquiescence. 
Therefore, the subgame perfect equilibrium in the final stage is: 
              Table 2 Firm’s strategy in stage 3 
E3 when CE <(r-rL)R 
Firm 
A3 when CE ≥(r-rL)R 
              Note: The subscript 3 denotes the third stage. 
Determining the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of the government in the 
second stage requires the distinction of the cases CE <(r-rL)R and CE ≥(r-rL)R in order 
to anticipate the payoff maximizing response of the firm in the final stage. Suppose 
that CE <(r-rL)R, i.e. the firm chooses Exit in the third stage, the government’s payoff 
is: 
   
Obviously, government will choose Reduce, because rLR+αCV-CC > αCV. If CE 
≥(r-rL)R, i.e. the firm chooses Acquiesce in the third stage, the government’s payoff 
becomes: 
 
The government will maintain present tax rate because rLR+αCV-CC < rR+αCV-CC. 
The subgame perfect equilibrium in the second stage is: 
Table 3 Government’s strategy in stage 2 
R2 when CE <(r-rL)R 
Government 
M2 when CE ≥(r-rL)R 
Note: The subscript 2 denotes the second stage. 
In the first stage, if CE <(r-rL)R, the firm predicts government’s strategy in the second 
stage will be Reduce and thus firm’s payoff of Voice will be (1-rL)R-CV. Consequently, 
firm maximizes payoff of Acquiescence, Voice and Exit: 
 
If CV<CE<(r-rL)R => (1-rL)R-CV>(1-r)R>(1-rL)R-CE, firm chooses Voice; if 
}EVLV, C-C-)Rr-(1 , C-r)R-{(1EAMax
}+ VCVL, C , C-CR{r ααMRMax
}++ VCVL, CrR , C-CR{r ααMRMax
}ELVL,, C-)Rr-(1 ,C-)Rr-(1 r)R,-{(1EVAMax
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CE<(r-rL)R<CV => (1-rL)R-CE>(1-r)R>(1-rL)R-CV, firm prefers Exit; and if 
CE<CV<(r-rL)R => (1-rL)R-CE>(1-rL)R-CV>(1-r)R, firm’s optimal strategy is Exit. 
 
If CE ≥(r-rL)R, government will maintain the present tax rate in the second stage and 
make firm to acquiesces in the final stage. Therefore, firm’s payoff of Voice in the 
first stage is (1-r)R-CV and maximizing payoff is: 
 
Thus, CE ≥(r-rL)R => (1-r)R>(1-r)R-CV and (1-r)R>(1-rL)R-CE, firm chooses 
Acquiesce.   
The subgame perfect equilibrium in the first stage is therefore: 
Table 4 Firm’s strategy in stage 1 
V1 when CE<(r-rL)R and CV<CE 
E1 when CE<(r-rL)R and CE<CV Firm 
A1 when CE ≥(r-rL)R 
Note: The subscript 1 denotes the first stage. 
According to different combination of exit and voice cost, we have such propositions: 
Proposition 1: If CE<(r-rL)R and CV<CE, firm will voice and local government 
will response to reduce present tax rate. 
 
Proposition 2:If CE<(r-rL)R and CE<CV, firm will exit to neighbor region for 
more preferential tax treatment. 
 
Proposition 3: If CE≥(r-rL)R, firm will acquiesce the present tax rate. 
 
3.3 Implications of the basic model 
The proceeding simple model illustrates how relative exit and voice cost determine a 
rational entrepreneur’s behavior in the game played with local government for 
preferential tax treatments. A basic implication is that the exit-availability rather than 
unavailability stimulates and strengthens voice practice in that either high exit or 
}ELV,, C-)Rr-(1 ,C-)Rr-(1 r)R,-{(1EVAMax
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voice cost impedes firm to opt for voice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With regard to possible combinations of high-low possibilities of exit and voice cost 
for two players’ decisions, Figure 2 depicts corresponding equilibrium outcome of the 
game. The watershed between high and low cost for exit and voice is the potential 
benefit gained from preferential tax treatments, (r-rL)R. The left column shows that 
exit cost under the threshold allows firm easily to migrate between regions for 
preferential tax treatments. In Proposition 2, exit cost is even lower than voice cost so 
as to indulge firm in frequent migrations between regions and leaves no room for 
voice to be considered. The exit strategy profits the most for firm. The equilibrium 
outcome, therefore, is firm directly exits to neighbor region in the first stage. Yet, 
when voice cost becomes so favorable (lower than exit cost) that firm would benefit 
larger from voice than exit in Proposition 1. The exit turns to be last resort after voice. 
Then, underpinned by the threat of exit, firm’s voice might receive local government’s 
compromise of offering preferential tax treatments. In Proposition 3, the high exit cost 
blocks firm’s exit option and should encourage firm to utilize voice according to 
Hirschman’s theory (1970). However, no matter whether firm resort to voice and as 
long as local government perceive that firm are unable to exit, they would remain 
present tax burden in accordance with Ramsey’s rule (1927) taxing most the immobile 
factors. Then, firm would rather stay and renounce any attempt of voice in the first 
stage. In short, with the intention of enhancing effective mobility, firms may, in the 
real world, implement various measures such as changing organization form into 
1: {Voice}/{Reduce} 3: {Acquiesce} 
2: {Exit}  3: {Acquiesce} 
Exit cost 
Low                    High 
Low  
 
 
High  
Voice cost 
Figure 2 Comparative statics of the basic model 
CE =(r-rL)R 
CV =CE 
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holding company or group management system, diversifying investments in different 
regions etc. In particular, firms will resort partial-exit by only registering headquarter 
or establishing new nominal affiliated enterprise in neighbor regions in which 
favorable tax policy is offered so as to lower the exit cost.  
 
4. Exit-voice game: the extended model 
4.1 Structure of the game 
In the real world, firm may hold private information of exit cost that causes 
information asymmetry problem in the game against local government. By 
introducing an artificial player, Nature, we extend the basic model with imperfect 
information in which Nature firstly decides firm type of exit cost with probability pL 
(∈(0,1)) for low exit cost CEL and 1-PL for high one CEH. Figure 3 gives the 
extensive-form representation of the game. The dashed line denotes the same 
information set for local government who doesn’t know firm’s type of exit cost but 
only its probability distribution. Considering 12 possible cases of combination of CV, 
CEL, CEH, and (r-rL)R, we suppose CV<CEL<(r-rL)R<CEH, i.e. voice is always 
profitable to firm, and keep the analysis within an operable bound. Furthermore, this 
assumption is in accordance with the real world and offers the most interesting 
economic implications. Other things are the same as those in Figure 1. 
 
4.2 Nash equilibria and propositions 
Combining backwards induction technique and strategic form (Appendix 3), we have 
such Nash equilibria and propositions5: 
  
Proposition 4: If CV<CEL<(r-rL)R<CEH and pL<(r-rL)R/(rR-CC), 
low-exit-cost-type firm will exit and high-exit-cost-type firm will acquiesce the 
present tax rate.  
 
                                                        
5 We concentrate on the pure-strategy Nash equilibia in this paper but we give the results of mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibia in Appendix 3. 
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Proposition 5: If CV<CEL<(r-rL)R<CEH and pL≥(r-rL)R/(rR-CC), 
low-exit-cost-type firm will exit and high-exit-cost-type firm will acquiesce the 
present tax rate or both types of firm will voice while local government will 
response to reduce tax rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Implications of the extended model 
Holding a little private information of the exit cost, the firm has advantage in the 
game. One straightforward outcome is that no matter what the probability of low exit 
type is, the low-exit-type firm chooses exit and high-exit-type firm chooses 
acquiescence. Either action will end the game in the first stage as shown in the 
equilibrium outcome in Proposition 4 and 5 (Figure 4). However, another interesting 
implication is when the probability pL is higher than (r-rL)R/(rR-CC), the 
high-exit-cost-type firm might bluff local government into believing that it has low 
exit cost and is able to move, thereby forcing local government to give preferential tax 
treatments. Due to such information asymmetry, the less mobile firm might mimic 
behaviors of those high and pretend to be low exit cost type. The firm will adopt the 
organization forms with high mobility such as holding company or group 
Upper: Payoff to firm 
Lower: Payoff to local government  
Figure 3 Extensive form of the extended model 
(1-rL)R-CV -CEL 
αCV 
(1-r)R 
rR-CC 
(1-rL)R-CV 
rLR+αCV-CC 
(1-r)R-CV  
rR+αCV-CC 
(1-rL)R-CEL 
0 
Firm 
Firm 
Government
Voice 
Acquiesce 
MaintainReduce 
Exit 
Exit 
Acquiesce 
(1-rL)R-CV -CEH 
αCV 
(1-r)R 
rR-CC 
(1-rL)R-CV 
rLR+αCV-CC 
(1-r)R-CV  
rR+αCV-CC 
(1-rL)R-CEH 
0 
Firm 
Firm 
Voice
Acquiesce 
Maintain Reduce 
Exit 
Exit 
Acquiesce 
Nature 
pL 1-pL 
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management system, diversify investments in different regions and practice voice to 
local government.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Empirical case 
We present three empirical cases of different types of firm to illustrate the 
implications of our model, showing how exit and voice cost influence firm’s behavior 
and leads to dynamic interaction between the firm and local government. These three 
cases are Procter & Gamble (foreign enterprise), Shenzhen Changhong (foreign 
investment enterprise) and Wenzhou Sanlian (domestic private enterprise) 6. 
 
5.1 Case 1: Procter & Gamble 
In 1980s, Procter & Gamble launched a joint venture, Procter & Gamble-Hutchison 
Ltd. (P&G-H), with Hutchison Whampoa (China) Ltd (HWCL), a Hong Kong-based 
company who has extensive relations with Chinese government (with P&G holding 
69.25 per cent and HWCL 30.75 per cent). Under the help of HWCL, P&G set up 
Guangzhou P&G with Guangzhou Soap Factory (GSF) and the Import and Export 
Trade Corporation for Construction of Guangzhou Economic and Technological 
Development Zone (GETDZ) in August 1988. The registered capital was $10 million 
(GSF 25 per cent, GETDZ 5 per cent and P&G-H 70 per cent). After then, P&G 
rapidly expanded operations in China: Guangzhou P&G Paper Products Ltd started in 
1990; Beijing and Shanghai Branches in 1991; Guangzhou P&G Detergent Products 
Ltd in 1992; Beijing Panda P&G, Chengdu P&G and Tianjin P&G in 1993; 
Guangzhou Lonkey P&G in 1994; Guangzhou P&G Oral Care Products Ltd in 1995, 
                                                        
6  The case study bases on interviews, document data (e.g. www.pg.com, www.sz-changhong.com , 
www.sz-changhong.com ), and other publications (e.g. Dyer, D., Dalzell, F. and Olegario, R. (2004). Rising Tide: 
Lessons from 165 Years of Brand Building at Procter & Gamble. Harvard Business School Press.). 
4: {Exit, Acquiesce} 5: {Exit, Acquiesce} 
5: {Voice, Voice}/{Reduce} 
Probability of low-exit-cost 
Low                    High 
Low  
Voice cost 
Figure 4 Equilibrium outcome of the extended model 
pL=(r-rL)R/(rR-CC) 
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etc. Until now, P&G has thirteen joint ventures and wholly owned companies -- 
located in Guangzhou, Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Tianjin and Suzhou.  
 
In addition to market factors why P&G rushed to expand operations in other regions, 
to enhance mobility and spread risks are significant two motivations behind such 
expanding strategy. In 1993, the establishment of P&G (China), a holding company, 
further served proceeding two purposes in that such organization form allows capital, 
information, raw material, products and so on to be easily reallocated and exchanged 
among affiliated enterprise, thereby dramatically cutting down the local dependence 
and exit cost of certain subsidiary in a locality. P&G not only implement tax planning 
by shifting income between subsidiaries in different regions via transfer pricing but 
also use financial techniques such as thin capitalization (debit and credit between 
affiliated enterprises) to lessen corporate income tax burden. In 2002, Guangzhou 
P&G took a substantive loan of 2 billion RMB and lent them to its affiliated 
enterprises free of interests. Therefore, Guangzhou P&G manipulated income tax base 
by both deducting itself interest cost from profit before tax and escaping taxable 
interest income from its affiliated enterprises and evaded 81.5 million RMB of due tax 
payment (CBT, 2004).  
 
Furthermore, P&G dedicates arduous efforts to cultivate strong relationships with 
government officials at the national and especially provincial and local levels. During 
period of 1996-2003, P&G’s donation to China’s rural education, Project Hope, has 
added up to 16 million RMB with 100 primary schools in 27 provinces. P&G also 
donated 10.7 million RMB to Tsinghua University, 7 million RMB to Ministry of 
Education, 1.5 million to China Wildlife Conservation Foundation for Panda, 1 
million RMB to 1999 World Gymnastics Championships (Tianjin), 3 million RMB to 
the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, etc. Thus, the CEO of Greater China P&G has been 
awarded to meet high-ranking government officials, including former Premier Zhu 
Rongji and Li Peng, former Vice Premier Qian Qichen, Wu Xueqian and Tian Jiyun 
and mayors of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, etc. In 1998, Mr. Dimitri 
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Panayotopoulos, former CEO of Greater China P&G, was honored with Glory Citizen 
by Guangzhou government. Depending on such solid networks with governments at 
all levels, P&G might voice for unusual concessions from them such as special 
generous treatment or other requirement. For instance, State Administration of 
Taxation (Guangdong) granted P&G special tax deduction of 86.8 million RMB for 
disposal of asset loss in 20027. In the same year, Guangzhou government also yielded 
up its shares in the joint venture, Guangzhou P&G, since P&G phased in its wholly 
owned strategy in China and then menaced to move to Tianjin if such requirement 
was unable to be fulfilled. As a result, P&G controlled 99 per cent shares of 
Guangzhou P&G and left only 1 per cent to Guangzhou government as a symbol. 
 
5.2 Case 2: Shenzhen Changhong 
Founded in 1997, Shenzhen Changhong  (SZCH) specializes in manufacturing 
precision moulds and becomes a leading company in the mould industry. SZCH has 
total asset of 130 million RMB and 288 employees, whose accumulated sales revenue 
and net profits is more than 90 million RMB and 20 million RMB since 2001. Its key 
customers include Panasonic, Konica-Minolta, Canon, Epson, Brother, Sony, 
Samsung, Sharp, and Ricoh and the like. In 2002, Hongkong Changhong (HKCH) 
was established to deal with import and export trade. Two years later, a joint venture, 
Shanghai Changmei (SHCM), was founded with registered capital of 18 million RMB 
(HKCH 70 per cent and SZCH 30 per cent).  
 
SZCH has three shareholders: Mr. Li (80 per cent), Hua (10 per cent) and Xu (10 per 
cent), who are townies and have known each other for ten years. They all have 
extensive guanxi network with local officials. In particular, Mr. Hua invests 
substantive time and money to cultivate an intimate guanxi network with several local 
officials of Shenzhen LG district, such as Mr. Zhang, director of Bank of China, Mr. 
Peng, director of Economic and Trade Bureau, Mr. Xiong, director of Science and 
                                                        
7 On July 2 2004, State Administration of Taxation (Guangdong) issued a circular (Yu Guoshui Han [2004] 333) to 
authorize Guangzhou Municipal Office on offering P&G special tax deduction of 86.8 million RMB for disposal 
of asset loss in 2002. 
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Technology Bureau, and Mr. Wang, governor of PS Township. Therefore, SZCH 
benefits a lot from this network. In 2003, Mr. Xiong accredited SZCH as the 
Shenzhen New & High-Tech Company that lent various preferential policy packages 
to SZCH, including three-year-tax-exempt and six-year-half-tax-duty (corporate 
income tax, CIT), tax-exempt of import equipment, low-price-land and 
low-interest-loan. Furthermore, due to the New & High-Tech qualification, Mr. Peng 
granted 50 million RMB quota of interest-exempt loan and then Mr. Zhang loaned 45 
million RMB to SZCH. Meanwhile, these three entrepreneurs purchased 25,000 sq. m. 
lands from Mr. Wang in PS Township with a low price of 160 RMB per sq. m., which 
saved 8.5 million RBM according to the normal market price. In 2004, they moved 
from AL Township to the new factory built in PS Township. Although the relocation 
lasted for three months, the total exit cost was not so much because the AL and PS 
Township are located in the same LG district. Meanwhile, aiming to spread risk and 
increase mobility, they also invested a joint venture (SHCM) with HKCH in Shanghai, 
in which they enjoy two-year-tax-exempt and three-year-half-tax-duty (CIT). 
However, they regard SHCM as a backup to easily reallocate asset in case that SZCH 
goes to bankrupt or to strengthen their bargaining power for more preferential policy 
treatment from PS township government.  
 
5.3 Case 3: Wenzhou Sanlian 
In his hometown AJ Township, P County, Mr. Wang set up Wenzhou Sanlian (WZSL) 
to produce gear units in 1985. After twenty years development, WZSL becomes a 
group company with total asset of 200 million RMB and 500 employees, diversifying 
in several sectors of variable speed machinery, real estate, fancy paper, and water 
supply.  
 
As a local people and former chairman of Private Entrepreneur Association, Mr. Wang 
embraces an extensive and embedded guanxi network in P County that greatly 
facilitates his business. For instance, WZSL was accredited as Wenzhou New & 
Hi-Tech Company in 2000 and therefore enjoyed a three-year-tax-exempt (CIT) and 
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purchased 34,000 sq. m. land in the industry park with only 225 RMB per sq. m 
(market price 600 RMB per sq. m). However, a political struggle between the 
governor, Mr. Dai, and party secretary, Mr. Cao, of P County nearly destroyed his 
guanxi network and business in 2002 since his political friends from both sides 
betrayed him. The aftermath spread to the co-project with P county government on 
water supply (county government 51 per cent, Mr. Wang 49 per cent), which not only 
cost him 50 million RMB, but also brought two million RMB loss every year because 
the county government refuse to implement their agreement to purchase the water at 
the price of 1.55 RMB per ton and force Mr. Wang to accept the price of 0.6 RMB 
with the menace of tax inspection on WZSL and withdraw the preferential tax 
treatment. Thus, Mr. Wang considered moving out. 
 
In 2003, the governor of Y County, Shangdong Province, thousands kilometers far 
from Wenzhou, came to attract investment by offering preferential policy package of 
five-year-tax-exempt and five-year-half-tax-duty (CIT), free of land (only 7 RMB per 
sq. m.) and sufficient bank loan. With regard to such attractive offer, Mr. Wang 
purchased 134,000 sq. m. land and got a loan of 20 million RMB from Construction 
Bank Y County branch to build a new factory there. Yet, Mr. Wang underestimated the 
exit cost in that the total shift will stop production for at least half year that will 
accrue a significant loss of 20 million RMB. Political risk in Y County, Shangdong 
Province, is another unstable factor. The government officials there are even more 
corrupt and less creditable and accountable than those in P County, Wenzhou. 
Consequently, Mr. Wang decided to temporarily move ten per cent of production 
capacity to his new factory in 2004 and leave the final decision to next year. When 
government officials of P County were aware of Mr. Wang’s exit, they conceded by 
appropriating provincial earmarked grants of 20 million RMB to the loss-making 
water-supply co-project and negotiating with Industrial & Commercial Bank P County 
branch for offsetting total 69 million RMB long-term loan on the water-supply 
company by only returning 40 million RMB. Furthermore, WZSL was accredited as 
Wenzhou New & Hi-tech Company and thus granted a three-year tax holiday again in 
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2004. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The complex interplay between exit and voice hampers further empirical application 
of Hirschman’s theory because of a lack of clarity in that too many situations may 
happen to determine different possible results: the exit may surpass voice and vice 
versa, or voice may join exit as a mixed strategy, or both options would be abandoned. 
Moreover, vague notion of voice weakens its operation. No rigorous methodology or 
decent research is conducted to address such problems (Dowding, et al., 2000).  
 
From the point view of transaction cost economics, we clarify the critical factors of 
relative cost of exit and voice and information structure that ultimately decide the 
outcomes, especially, in the case of exit-voice game between firm and government for 
preferential tax treatments in local China. Given the Chinese characteristic, firms 
voice via cultivating, maintaining and expanding guanxi network with government 
officials at all levels. A rational economizing of relevant transaction cost of exit-voice 
helps firm to create the right strategy against government. The possible outcomes, 
thus, depend on combinations of exit-voice cost. Particularly, in contrast to 
Hirschman’s doubt that easy exit would undermine utilization of voice, the analysis 
suggests potential exit not only allures firm to opt for voice but also reinforces firm’s 
voice. Acknowledging the essence of mobility, firm may carry out various measures 
in order to promote effective mobility or merely camouflage as a higher mobile firm 
to government who is unaware of exact exit cost. The information asymmetry 
facilitates firm to impose pressure on government by threat of migration to other 
regions.   
 
The policy implication is that discriminated tax incentive is needed to deal with 
private information of mobility. For those relative immobile industries with heavy 
investment, government should fix and restrict tax policy while offer preferential tax 
menu to those others. Meanwhile, an information revealing mechanism should be 
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established to identify firm’s type of exit cost. The annual financial audit report of 
accountant is a reliable source in that the investment level shows the degree of lock-in, 
which is sunk cost in a locality and the profit level presents its opportunity cost 
weighed in the exit-voice calculation. The level of voice investment in networks could 
also be checked as a parameter.  
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Appendix 1 
Various national-level special zones 
Special Zones Number 
Main preferential Taxation Policies  
(FIEs and FEs)a 
Special Economic Zones (SEZ) 5 Corporate income tax rate at 15%. 
Economic and Technological 
Development Zones (ETDZ) 
54 
Production-oriented enterprises are subject to 
corporate income tax rate at 15%. 
Hi-Tech Industry Development 
Zones (HTIDZ) 
53 
High or new technology enterprises are subject to 
corporate income tax rate at 15%. 
Free Trade Zone (FTZ) 15 
Export-oriented enterprises are subject to 
corporate income tax rate at 15%. 
Border Economic Cooperation 
Zone (BECZ) 
14 
Two-year-exemption of corporate income tax and 
three-year-reduction of 50% since profitable year. 
Export Processing Zone (EPZ) 38 VAT refund on export goods. 
Tourist and Holiday Resort (THR) 11 Corporate income tax rate at 24%. 
Taiwanese Investment Zone (TIZ) 4 Corporate income tax rate at 15%. 
Central and Western Regions of 
China 
20 Similar to policies in SEZs and ETDZs. 
a Foreign investment enterprises (FIEs); Foreign enterprises (FEs). 
Source: China Association of Development Zones (CADZ), www.cadz.org.cn  
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Appendix 2 
Name list of 54 multinationals for joint-petition 
ABB EXXON MOBILE NOKIA 
ALCATEL GE OMRON 
ALSTOM GENERAL MILLS ORACLE 
AMAT GM OTIS 
AMWAY HONEYWELL PANASONIC 
BASF HP PEPSI 
BAYER IBM PHILIPS 
BP IKEA PRAXAIR 
DEGUSSA ITOCHU SAMSUNG 
DELL KCC SCHNEIDER 
DELPHI KODAK SHELL 
DHL KRAFT SIEMENS 
DUPONT LEXMARK SOJITZ 
E28 METRO SONY 
EFFEM MICROSOFT TNT 
EMRSN MOTOROLA TOSHIBA 
EPSON NCR UNILEVER 
ERICSSON NESTLE YUM 
Source: China Business Times, January 13, 2005, www.cbt.com.cn  
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Appendix 3 
 
Nash equilibria of the extended model 
Following backwards induction to solve this game for Nash equilibria, we start at the 
third stage in which firm maximized its payoff by choosing possible actions. A 
strategic form is presented to solve for equilibria in stage 1 and 2 due to asymmetric 
information problem.  
 
A strategy of the firm in the third stage of the game has to specify two actions, i.e. the 
responses to government’s Maintain action when firm is low or high exit cost type. 
Analogous to section 3.2, the Nash equilibrium strategy in the final stage of the game 
is: 
Table 1 Firm’s strategy in stage 3 
(A3, A3) 
when (1-r)R-CV>(1-rL)R-CV-CEL and (1-r)R-CV>(1-rL)R-CV-CEH  
=> (r-rL)R< CEL<CEH 
(E3, A3) 
when (1-r)R-CV<(1-rL)R-CV-CEL and (1-r)R-CV>(1-rL)R-CV-CEH  
=> CEL<(r-rL)R<CEH 
Firm 
(E3, E3) 
when (1-r)R-CV<(1-rL)R-CV-CEL and (1-r)R-CV<(1-rL)R-CV-CEH 
=> CEL<CEH<(r-rL)R 
Note: The subscript 3 denotes the third stage. 
Considering 12 possible cases of combination of CV, CEL, CEH, and (r-rL)R and to 
keep the analysis within an operable bound, we suppose CV<CEL<(r-rL)R<CEH, i.e. 
voice is always profitable to firm. Furthermore, this assumption is in accordance with 
the real world and offers the most interesting economic implications.   
 
If CV<CEL<(r-rL)R<CEH, firm will choose (E3, A3) in the final stage. This strategy is 
incorporated in the strategic form of the first two stages in Table 2. The 
Nash-equilibrium response of the government is to choose Reduce when the firm 
chooses either (V1, A1) or (V1, E1) because R2>M2; when the firm selects (A1, V1) or 
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Table 2 Strategic form of firm and government in stage 1 and 2 
Government  
Firm 
R2 M2 
(A1, A1) ( (1-r)R, rR-CC ) ( (1-r)R, rR-CC ) 
(A1, V1) ( pL(1-r)R+ (1-pL)[(1-rL)R-CV], pL(rR-CC) +(1-pL)(rLR+αCV-CC) ) ( pL(1-r)R+ (1-pL)[(1-r)R-CV], pL(rR-CC) + (1-pL)(rR+αCV-CC) ) 
(A1, E1) ( pL(1-r)R+(1-pL)[(1-rL)R-CEH], pL(rR-CC) ) ( pL(1-r)R+(1-pL)[(1-rL)R-CEH], pL(rR-CC) ) 
(V1, A1) ( pL[(1-rL)R-CV]+ (1-pL) (1-r)R, pL(rLR+αCV-CC)+(1-pL)(rR-CC) ) ( pL[(1-rL)R-CV-CEL]+ (1-pL)(1-r)R, pLαCV+(1-pL)(rR-CC) ) 
(V1, V1) ( (1-rL)R-CV, rLR+αCV-CC ) ( pL[(1-rL)R-CV-CEL]+ (1-pL) [(1-r)R-CV], pLαCV +(1-pL)(rR+αCV-CC) ) 
(V1, E1) ( pL[(1-rL)R-CV]+ (1-pL) [(1-rL)R-CEH], pL(rLR+αCV-CC) ) ( pL[(1-rL)R-CV-CEL]+ (1-pL)[(1-rL)R-CEH], pLαCV ) 
(E1, A1) ( pL[(1-rL)R-CEL]+ (1-pL)(1-r)R, (1-pL)(rR-CC) ) ( pL[(1-rL)R-CEL]+ (1-pL)(1-r)R, (1-pL)(rR-CC) ) 
(E1, V1) ( pL[(1-rL)R-CEL] +(1-pL)[(1-rL)R-CV], (1-pL)(rLR+αCV-CC) ) ( pL[(1-rL)R-CEL] +(1-pL)[(1-r)R-CV], (1-pL)(rR+αCV-CC) ) 
(E1, E1) ( pL[(1-rL)R-CEL]+ (1-pL)[(1-rL)R-CEH], 0 ) ( pL[(1-rL)R-CEL]+ (1-pL)[(1-rL)R-CEH], 0 ) 
Note: The subscript 1 and 2 denotes the first and second stage, respectively.
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(E1, V1), the government will prefer Maintain, because M2>R2; while the government 
will be indifferent facing firm’s actions of (A1, A1), (A1, E1) or (E1, E1), because 
M2=R2. If the firm chooses (V1, V1), the payoff-maximizing strategy of the 
government depends on pL versus (r-rL)R/(rR-CC). When pL≥(r-rL)R/(rR-CC), the 
government prefer Reduce to Maintain and vice versa.  
 
Using iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies for firm, it follows from 
Table 2 that (A1, A1)<(V1, V1), (A1, V1)<(E1, V1), (A1, E1)<(V1, E1), (V1, A1)<(V1, V1), 
(V1, E1)<(V1, A1), (E1, A1)<(E1, V1), (E1, E1)<(E1, V1) and (E1, V1)<(V1, V1) in the left 
column, i.e. government chooses Reduce. Similarly, in the right column of 
government’s Maintain strategy, firm’s payoff is as such: (A1, A1)<(E1, A1), (A1, 
V1)<(A1, A1), (A1, E1)<(E1, A1), (V1, A1)<(E1, A1), (V1, V1)<(V1, A1), (V1, E1)<(V1, 
A1), (E1, V1)<(E1, A1) and (E1, E1)<(E1, V1). Thus, simplify Table 2 into Table 3, we 
have Nash equilibra dependent on the value of pL. 
 
Table 3 Simplified strategic form of firm and government in stage 1 and 2 
Government  
Firm R2 M2 
(V1, V1) ( (1-rL)R-CV, rLR+αCV-CC ) 
( pL[(1-rL)R-CV-CEL]+ (1-pL)[(1-r)R-CV], 
pLαCV+(1-pL)(rR+αCV-CC) ) 
(E1, A1) 
( pL[(1-rL)R-CEL]+(1-pL)(1-r)R, 
(1-pL)(rR-CC) ) 
( pL[(1-rL)R-CEL]+(1-pL)(1-r)R, 
(1-pL)(rR-CC) ) 
 
Case 1: pL<(r-rL)R/(rR-CC) 
When pL<(r-rL)R/(rR-CC), government will prefer M2 when firm chooses (V1, V1) 
(Table 4). We use a graphical representation to solve for the Nash equilibrium.  
 
Table 4 The Nash equilibrium in stage 1 and 2 (pL<(r-rL)R/(rR-CC)) 
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Government  
Firm R2 M2 
(V1, V1) 
( (1-rL)R-CV, rLR+αCV-CC ) ( pL[(1-rL)R-CV-CEL]+ (1-pL) [(1-r)R-CV], 
pLαCV+(1-pL)(rR+αCV-CC) ) 
(E1, A1) 
( pL[(1-rL)R-CEL]+(1-pL)(1-r)R, 
(1-pL)(rR-CC) ) 
( pL[(1-rL)R-CEL]+(1-pL)(1-r)R,  
(1-pL)(rR-CC) ) 
 
Suppose (p, 1-p) be the mixed strategy in which firm chooses (V1, V1) with 
probability p (∈[0,1]) and (E1, A1) with 1-p and suppose (q, 1-q) be government’s 
mixed strategy choosing R2 with probability q (∈ [0,1]) and M2 with 1-q. If 
government plays (q, 1-q), firm’s expected payoffs are PF(V, 
V)=q[(1-rL)R-CV]+(1-q){pL[(1-rL)R-CV-CEL]+ (1-pL) [(1-r)R-CV]} from choosing (V1, 
V1) and PF(E, A)=q{pL[(1-rL)R-CEL]+(1-pL)(1-r)R}+(1-q){pL[(1-rL)R-CEL]+(1-pL)(1-r)R} 
from choosing (E1, A1). Then, the best-response correspondence of firm is (Figure 1): 
 
        1 for PF(V, V)> PF(E, A) => q>q' (q'=CV/[(1-pL)(r-rL)R+pLCEL]); 
p*(q)=  0 for PF(V, V)< PF(E, A) => q<q'; 
        ∈[0,1] for PF(V, V)= PF(E, A) => q=q' 
 
Similarly, if firm plays (p, 1-p), government’s expected payoffs are 
PG(R)=p(rLR+αCV-CC)+(1-p)(1-pL)(rR-CC) from choosing R2 and 
PG(M)=p[pLαCV+(1-pL)(rR+αCV-CC)]+(1-p)(1-pL)(rR-CC) from choosing M2. The 
best-response correspondence of government is: 
 
        0 for PG(R)< PG(M) => p>0; 
       ∈[0,1] for PG(R)= PG(M) => p=0 
 
Thus, in Figure 1, the intersection of p*(q) and q*(p) is the horizontal segment: (p=0, 
q< q'). We have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium: Firm (E1, A1) when p=0 and q=0 
{
{q*(p)= 
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and a continuum of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria: Firm (E1, A1) and Government (q, 
1-q) when q< q'. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 2: pL>(r-rL)R/(rR-CC) 
When pL>(r-rL)R/(rR-CC), government will prefer R2 when firm chooses (V1, V1) 
(Table 5).  
Table 5 The Nash equilibrium in stage 1 and 2 (pL>(r-rL)R/(rR-CC)) 
Government  
Firm R2 M2 
(V1, V1) 
( (1-rL)R-CV, rLR+αCV-CC ) ( pL[(1-rL)R-CV-CEL]+ (1-pL) [(1-r)R-CV], 
pLαCV+(1-pL)(rR+αCV-CC) ) 
(E1, A1) 
( pL[(1-rL)R-CEL]+(1-pL)(1-r)R, 
(1-pL)(rR-CC) ) 
( pL[(1-rL)R-CEL]+(1-pL)(1-r)R,  
(1-pL)(rR-CC) ) 
 
Analogous to Figure 1, the best-response correspondence of firm p*(q) in Figure 2 is: 
i) if q>q', p*(q)=1; ii) if q<q', p*(q)=0; iii) if q=q', p*(q)∈[0, 1]. However, for the 
government: 
 
        1 for PG(R)> PG(M) => p>0; 
       ∈[0,1] for PG(R)= PG(M) => p=0 
p 
(V1, V1) 
(E1, A1) 
M2 R2 
q 
p*(q) 
q*(p) 
q' 
Figure 1 Graphical representation of firm and government’s best-response correspondence 
        (pL<(r-rL)R/(rR-CC)) 
NE 
q'=CV/[(1-pL)(r-rL)R+pLCEL ] 
1
1
{q*(p)= 
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Thus, in Figure 2, there are two intersections of p*(q) and q*(p): (p=1, q=1) and (p=0, 
q<q'). Therefore, we have two pure-strategy Nash equilibra: i) Firm (E1, A1); ii) Firm 
(V1, V1) and Government R2 and a continuum of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria: Firm 
(E1, A1) and Government (q, 1-q) when q< q'. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 3: pL=(r-rL)R/(rR-CC) 
When pL=(r-rL)R/(rR-CC), government will be indifferent when firm chooses (V1, V1) 
(Table 6).  
Table 6 The Nash equilibrium in stage 1 and 2 (pL=(r-rL)R/(rR-CC)) 
Government  
Firm R2 M2 
(V1, V1) 
( (1-rL)R-CV, rLR+αCV-CC ) ( pL[(1-rL)R-CV-CEL]+ (1-pL) [(1-r)R-CV], 
pLαCV+(1-pL)(rR+αCV-CC) ) 
(E1, A1) 
( pL[(1-rL)R-CEL]+(1-pL)(1-r)R, 
(1-pL)(rR-CC) ) 
( pL[(1-rL)R-CEL]+(1-pL)(1-r)R,  
(1-pL)(rR-CC) ) 
 
Since government’s expected payoffs of R2 equals to that of M2 (PG(R)= PG(M)) if firm 
plays (p, 1-p), the government is indifferent to choose either R2 or M2 for any value of 
p (the whole dark square in Figure 3). Thus, the intersection of p*(q) and q*(p) is the 
value of firm’s best-response correspondence p*(q). We have two pure-strategy Nash 
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Figure 2 Graphical representation of firm and government’s best-response correspondence 
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NE 
q'=CV/[(1-pL)(r-rL)R+pLCEL] 
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equilibra: i) Firm (E1, A1); ii) Firm (V1, V1) and Government R2 and a continuum of 
mixed-strategy Nash equilibria: i) if q>q', p*(q)=1 and if q<q', p*(q)=0, as indicated 
by two horizontal segments of p*(q) in Figure 3; ii) if q=q', p*(q') is the entire interval 
[0, 1], as indicated by the vertical segment of p*(q).  
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